![]() ![]() Perhaps most famously associated with the Uniting for Peace mechanism, in 1951 the Assembly called upon states to support continued UN military action in Korea, including to repel Chinese aggression, a feat that it has not repeated since. It has established peacekeeping forces with host state consent. It has recommended the imposition of sanctions against offending states. It has condemned violations of international law and called for cessation of these breaches. The resolution stipulates that either the General Assembly or Security Council can initiate an Emergency Special Session where, due to a “lack of unanimity of the permanent members,” the Council “fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In this case, the Assembly “shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” In the ten prior Emergency Special Sessions, the Assembly took and recommended a variety of measures. In response to Security Council deadlock on continued UN military action in Korea, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 377A on 3 November 1950. ![]() The nature of the Uniting for Peace mechanism has been extensively analyzed, such that only a brief outline of its key features is necessary here. It shows that, moving forward, there are various legal solutions open to the General Assembly, some creative, to mitigate the Security Council’s failures to act on the Ukraine situation. This Article discusses the legal significance of this resolution and revisits the powers available to the General Assembly in supporting the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. It resulted in the adoption of Resolution ES-11/1 by a large majority (141 for, five against and 35 abstentions). The Security Council took the unusual step (by majority vote) of deciding to call an Emergency Special Session given that Russia’s veto had “prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” For the first time since 1997, the General Assembly convened an Emergency Special Session on a new situation, broadcast live around the world, in which state diplomats joined together in large numbers to express their collective disapprobation of Russian aggression. The initiation of this session was prompted by the exercise of the veto power by Russia, thereby impeding the Security Council from adopting a resolution on the situation. In the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the United Nations (UN) General Assembly convened an Emergency Special Session under its Uniting for Peace mechanism. 2016: An International Jurisdiction for Corporate Atrocity Crimes.2017: Accountability for the Illegal Use of Force.The Impact of International Law on Refugees and Migration. ![]()
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